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XF-4SHLGDB-C
Research / Academic Paper ACTIVE

Do hostile takeovers stifle innovation? Evidence from antitakeover legislation and corporate patenting

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Abstract

ABSTRACT I examine how strong corporate governance proxied by the threat of hostile takeovers affects innovation and firm value. I find a significant decline in the number of patents and citations per patent for firms incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do not. Most of the impact of antitakeover laws on innovation occurs 2 or more years after they are passed, indicating a causal effect. The negative effect of antitakeover laws is mitigated by the presence of alternative governance mechanisms such as large shareholders, pension fund ownership, leverage, and product market competition.

Source: resolved

Document Metadata

Issuer
Elsevier BV
Document Type
Research / Academic Paper
Publication Year
2013
Retrieved
5 May 2026
Source
Contact XFID for Access
Record ID
XF4SHLGDBC
Validation
Inferred by XFID

Topics

Corporate Governance

Cited by (1)

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Academic / report citation
Elsevier BV (2013). Do hostile takeovers stifle innovation? Evidence from antitakeover legislation and corporate patenting. XFID: XF-4SHLGDB-C. Retrieved from https://xframework.id/XF4SHLGDBC
Identifier only
XF-4SHLGDB-C