Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud?

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Abstract

ABSTRACT To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In‐depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing.

Source: resolved

Document Metadata

Issuer: Wiley
Document Type: Research / Academic Paper
Publication Year: 2010
Retrieved: 5 May 2026
Source: Contact XFID for Access
Record ID: XF3HSK91AV
Validation: Inferred by XFID

Topics

Corporate GovernanceInformation Asymmetry

Cited by (1)

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Academic / report citation

Wiley (2010). Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud?. XFID: XF-3HSK91A-V. Retrieved from https://xframework.id/XF3HSK91AV

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XF-3HSK91A-V