Registry › XF-SYPKSR0-W
XF-SYPKSR0-W
Research / Academic Paper ACTIVE

Duration of Executive Compensation

Abstract Only — The full paper PDF is not available in the registry. This XFID was minted from the paper's title, authors, and year. Where available, an abstract is provided below; the link to the publisher's record is canonical.

Abstract

ABSTRACT Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of “short‐termism” in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such short‐termism. We develop a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby quantifying the extent to which compensation is short‐term. We calculate pay duration in various industries and document its correlation with firm characteristics. Pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, more long‐term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings‐increasing accruals.

Source: resolved

Document Metadata

Issuer
Wiley
Document Type
Research / Academic Paper
Publication Year
2014
Retrieved
5 May 2026
Source
Contact XFID for Access
Record ID
XFSYPKSR0W
Validation
Inferred by XFID

Topics

Agency TheoryCorporate Governance

Cited by (1)

Other RESEARCH documents in the registry that cite this work.

How to Cite This Record

Use the XFID in citations to create a stable, permanent reference that resolves to this registry entry regardless of the source URL.

Academic / report citation
Wiley (2014). Duration of Executive Compensation. XFID: XF-SYPKSR0-W. Retrieved from https://xframework.id/XFSYPKSR0W
Identifier only
XF-SYPKSR0-W