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XF-UPIH3PF-5
Research / Academic Paper ACTIVE

Commercial banks in investment banking conflict of interest or certification role?

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Abstract

When commercial banks make loans to firms and also underwrite securities, does this hamper or enhance their role as certifiers of firm value? This paper examines empirically the pricing of bank-underwritten securities as compared to investment-house-underwritten securities over a unique period in the U.S. (pre-Glass-Steagall) when both banks and investment houses were allowed to underwrite securities. The evidence shows that investors were willing to pay higher prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than investment houses. The results support a certification role for banks, which is more valuable for junior and information sensitive securities.

Source: resolved

Document Metadata

Issuer
Elsevier BV
Document Type
Research / Academic Paper
Publication Year
1996
Retrieved
5 May 2026
Source
Contact XFID for Access
Record ID
XFUPIH3PF5
Validation
Inferred by XFID

Topics

Agency TheoryCorporate FinanceInformation Asymmetry

Cited by (1)

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Academic / report citation
Elsevier BV (1996). Commercial banks in investment banking conflict of interest or certification role?. XFID: XF-UPIH3PF-5. Retrieved from https://xframework.id/XFUPIH3PF5
Identifier only
XF-UPIH3PF-5