XF-YLNR4N3-5 Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers. Its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research. We argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved. By discussing its rich theoretical implications, we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency.
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Cites (5)
Works cited in this paper's bibliography that are themselves in the XFID registry.
- Dynamic Threshold Values in Earnings-Based Covenants (2016) Abstract
- Discussion of 'Accounting standards and debt covenants: Has the 'Balance Sheet Approach' led to a decline in the use of balance sheet covenants?' (2011) Abstract
- Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements (2009) Abstract
- Performance Pricing in Bank Debt Contracts (2005) Abstract
- Large–Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis (2002) Abstract
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Elsevier (Journal of Financial Economics) (2016). Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective. XFID: XF-YLNR4N3-5. Retrieved from https://xframework.id/XFYLNR4N35
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