Job Market Signaling

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Abstract

1. Introduction, 355. — 2. Hiring as investment under uncertainty, 356. — 3. Applicant signaling, 358. — 4. Informational feedback and the definition of equilibrium, 359. — 5. Properties of informational equilibria: an example, 361. — 6. The informational impact of indices, 368. — Conclusions, 374.

Source: resolved

Document Metadata

Issuer: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Document Type: Research / Academic Paper
Publication Year: 1973
Retrieved: 5 May 2026
Source: Contact XFID for Access
Record ID: XF65O5AKQ6
Validation: Inferred by XFID

Topics

Information AsymmetryStakeholder Theory

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Academic / report citation

Oxford University Press (OUP) (1973). Job Market Signaling. XFID: XF-65O5AKQ-6. Retrieved from https://xframework.id/XF65O5AKQ6

Identifier only

XF-65O5AKQ-6